We present an algorithm to compute the (pre)-kernel of a TU-game N, v with a system of n 2 1 linear programming problems. In contrast to the algorithms using convergence methods to compute a point of the (pre)-kernel the emphasis of the chosen method lies not on efficiency and guessing good starting points but on computing large parts or in good cases the whole (pre)-kernel of a game. The chosen algorithm computes on a first step by relying on linear programming the n 2 largest amounts∆ i j which can be transferred from player i to j while remaining in the core or in the strong epsilon core. The associated payoff vector is a midpoint of the core segment in i-j direction and is therefore a candidate that satisfies the bisection property. From these results we can determine in a sophisticated patternmatching procedure the constraints which are needed to construct the final linear programming problem for computing at least a (pre)-kernel point of the game. From the derived final linear program large parts or the whole kernel can be easily calculated. Finally, the program checks if the computed (pre)-kernel candidate belongs to the (pre)-kernel. In cases where the candidate doesn't pass the (pre)-kernel check, the function is called a further time with additional informations about the game. According to our tests a further call is necessary if the intersection set of the n 2 solution sets is empty, in this case no candidate of the final linear problem satisfies the bisection property. This implies that at least one largest transfer∆ i j is greater than the maximal transfer in i-j direction that is possible at a (pre)-kernel point x while remaining in the core, that is,∆ i j > ∆ i j x , with x . Hence, if the solution intersection set is non-empty, then all payoff vectors in the intersection set possess the bisection property and are therefore kernel elements. The kernel of a TU-game with an empty core can be computed by providing the epsilon value for the least-core as an additional information.
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INTRODUCTION
The kernel of an n-person transferable utility game was introduced by Davis & Maschler (1965) as an auxiliary solution concept to study general existence results and properties of the bargaining set of TUgames. There it was proved that the kernel is a subset of the bargaining set, and it is easier to compute than the bargaining set of a game. Nevertheless, the computational task to determine the kernel of a game is due to its characterization in terms of a system of linear inequalities inconvenient and requires in general non-systematic short cuts. Davis & Maschler have also presented a first indirect existence proof which was based on Brouwer's fixed point theorem. In Maschler & Peleg (1966) the non-emptiness of the kernel was proved by relying on algebraic arguments using a characterization by a representation formula based on a separation relation that was induced by the sets of coalitions. The separation relation is useful to determine
The author would like to thank Theo Driessen, Hendrik Hakenes, Anna Khmelnitskaya, Martha Saboyá Baquero, Axel Ostmann and anonymous referee. Holger I. Meinhardt, Institute for Statistics and Economic Theory, University of Karlsruhe, P.O. Box 69 80, Zirkel 2, D-76128 Karlsruhe, Germany. E-mail: hme@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de the polyhedra which are relevant to characterize the kernel. Davis & Maschler (1965) had already proved that the kernel can be described as the union of a finite number of closed convex polyhedra, but it was soon discovered that some of these polyhedra are superfluous. Due to the separation relation the kernel can be described by the representation formula as a union of all relevant closed and convex polyhedra. Furthermore, by restricting the kernel characterization on the relevant convex polyhedra it was possible to present a complete algebraic proof that there exist payoffs in the kernel. As a by product of this approach it was discovered that the kernel always intersects the core, if it is not empty. By relying on this result Schmeidler (1969) was led to discover the nucleolus as a further cooperative solution concept. Schmeidler proved that the nucleolus of a game consists of a unique point and that it is included in the kernel of a game. Thus, Schmeidler has also provided an indirect existence proof of the kernel and the bargaining set. Besides that the representation formula is helpful to establish existence of kernel elements it yields also to the conclusion that the kernel solution is in general not a convex set. Moreover, maximal dimension bounds of the kernel of n-person TU-games can be derived due to the formula given in Maschler & Peleg (1966) , and therefore in connection with the representation formula this provides us with some insight into the structure of the kernel. For instance, for three person games the maximal dimension of the kernel solution is zero and we can conclude that the kernel must be a singleton which coincides with the nucleolus of the game.
The kernel is not only interesting due its mathematical properties and that its reflects the structure of the game it has also the appealing property that it can be interpreted as a fair division scheme due to balancing the maximal losses/gains among the players of a game. Maschler, Peleg & Shapley (1979) gives an intuitive interpretation of the kernel which does not rely on interpersonal comparisons of utilities by using the geometric representation of the kernel. In this sense, the kernel is a midpoint of a bargaining range between each pair of players. This midpoint reflects in certain aspects a bargaining situation where each pair of players is symmetric with respect to the bargaining range. The endpoints of the bargaining range represents the maximal claim of a player in bilaterally bargaining that cannot opposed by another player by forming a coalition with other players to block the claim. A kernel payoff that balances the maximal claims among the players represents a multi-bilateral bargaining equilibrium. It was proved by Maschler et al. (1979) that such a kernel element always exists which belongs to the strong Ε-cores of the game.
Due to these appealing features of the kernel solution one can imagine many economic situations where one would like to apply the kernel as a fair division scheme. For instance, imagine the situation where the overheads costs of a firm must be distributed to the individual departments or imagine a financial market situation where one would like to construct a portfolio that equalize the real risk contributions of the individual assets. This task could be accomplished by relying on the kernel solution. Nevertheless, the task of computing a kernel element for large and asymmetric TU-games can be very cumbersome to perform. Maschler & Peleg (1967) have provided a set of rules to determine kernel elements but these rules become intractable for large and asymmetric TU-games. So it should not be surprising that at the very beginning of the kernel investigation a first convergence algorithm was described by Aumann, Peleg & Rabinowitz (1965) for calculating kernel solutions of all weighted majority games for at most five players. A recent convergence algorithm was proposed by Meseguer-Artola (1997) using the indirect function approach of Martinez-Legaz (1996) to determine elements of the kernel. By relying on the indirect function approach the pre-kernel of the game can be characterized as an overdetermined system of nonlinear equations. From this overdetermined system an equivalent minimization problem can be constructed whose set of global minimums coalesce with the pre-kernel set. The convergence algorithm to solve the minimization problem is based on the Steepest Descent Method for determining zeros of continuous functions. In contrast to the convergence algorithm Wolsey (1976) proposed an algorithm based on 0-1 linear integer programs to calculate the kernel and nucleolus of simple games.
In this paper, we present an alternative algorithm based on a system of linear programs to calculate the whole or at least large parts of the pre-kernel with respect to the grand coalition by using the geometric properties of the pre-kernel as it has been worked out by Maschler et al. (1979) . The idea behind our algorithm is to determine these parts of the pre-kernel which falls within the core or any other strong Ε-core of the game, and depends therefore on the geometrical shape of the latter. It was proved by these authors that an outcome that belongs to the kernel and to the core is always the midpoint of some straight line segment for each distinct pair of player, that is, the outcome satisfies the so-called bisection property. In non-technical terms, it is the midpoint of some bargaining range for each pair of players. The advantage to concentrate on the pre-kernel instead of the kernel is that the pre-kernel is defined in terms of a system of linear equalities instead of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, its easier to work with the pre-kernel than with the kernel. Both solution concepts are closely related and an imputation that is in the pre-kernel is also an imputation of the kernel. Moreover, for the class of zero-monotonic TU-games both solution concepts even coincide, that means in the context of studying economic situation that there is no analytical restriction to concentrate on this class of games, since most economic situations can be described as zeromonotonic TU-games.
The algorithm specifies an imputation vector that satisfies for each distinct pair of players the bisection property. In a first step the algorithm determines for every i-j direction the largest bi-symmetrical amounts (critical values) that can be transferred from player i to player j while remaining in the core or in any strong Ε-core. With every largest bi-symmetrical amount that can be transferred there is associated an imputation vector that is a midpoint of a corresponding straight line segment. This midpoint is a candidate to satisfy the bisection property. In a second step, we derive from the imputation vectors the corresponding excess vectors to determine the constraints to construct the final linear program for computing a pre-kernel element of the game. If the solution sets of all linear programming problems that were derived in the first step have non-empty intersection then the calculated pre-kernel candidate is a pre-kernel element. In the case that the intersection set is empty the computed imputation need not pass the kernel check, that means that the largest bi-symmetrical transfer is of no relevance to compute a pre-kernel element. An additional linear program is needed to perform a correction, which is an exact correction whenever the largest bisymmetrical transfer is characterized in terms of the transfer related to the pre-kernel payoff. If no such characterization is applied on the bi-symmetrical transfer, then the program must be called a further time with additional information about the game to assure that the strong Ε-core under consideration possesses the appropriate geometrical shape such that the intersection set of the solution sets of all linear programs is non-empty. If the numerical procedure to compute a solution of a linear optimization problem is based on the Simplex Algorithm, then the vertices of the solution sets can be calculated. Therefore, from the derived final linear program large parts or the whole pre-kernel can be determined.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we introduce some definitions and the essential results of the bisection property. We discuss some useful geometric representations of the kernel derived by Maschler et al. (1979) on which our algorithm is based on to determine kernel elements. In Section 3 we describe an algorithm that computes at least one kernel element by a system of n 2 1 linear problems. Section 4 provides the reader with some numerical examples to illustrate how the algorithm works, and what are its limitations and how we can overcome these limitations. In Section 5 we discuss an alternative linear programming approach by demonstrating that a kernel element is a solution of just one linear maximization problem. This result is similar to the result worked out by Kohlberg (1972) for the nucleolus, who proved that the nucleolus is the unique solution of a linear minimization problem. Therefore, we give an alternative linear programming approach for calculating the kernel and nucleolus for convex games. To represent a kernel element as a solution of a linear programming problem seems advantageous with respect to a parametric sensitivity analysis. For example, if the real-valued characteristic-function is treated as parameter, then the invariance of the kernel solution can be studied with respect to certain game properties. Especially, it can be easily scrutinized if the kernel solution remains invariant by turning a convex game into an average-convex game. Furthermore, due to the fact that our proposed algorithm is based on the geometrical properties of the kernel solution it can be used as a baseline in verifying solutions that have been computed by programs that are based on heuristic methods 1 . Finally, we present a numerical example taken from Maschler & Peleg (1966, Example 10.7) to illustrate how we can calculate large parts of non-convex kernel solutions by combining both procedures. We close the paper by some concluding remarks.
DEFINITION OF THE PRE-KERNEL AND ITS ESSENTIAL RESULTS
An n-person cooperative game with side payments is defined by an ordered pair N, v that we denote by . The set N 1, 2, , n represents the player set and v is the characteristic function with v 2 N IR and the convention that v 0. The real number v S IR is called the value or worth of a coalition S 2 N . In the sequel we will assume that v S 0 for all S N. A vector x x k k N IR N represents a payoff distribution on the player set N, where the payoff of player k is denoted by x k for all k N. A possible payoff allocation of the value v S for all S N is described by the projection of a vector x IR N on its S -coordinates such that x S v S for all S N, where we identify the S -coordinates of the vector x with the corresponding measure on S, such that x S k S x k . The set of vectors x IR N which satisfies the efficiency principle v N x N is called the pre-imputation set and it is defined by
where an element x is called a pre-imputation. Given a vector x , we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the imputation x in the game N, v by
A non-negative (non-positive) excess of S at x in the game N, v represents a gain (loss) to the members of the coalition S if the members of S do not accept the payoff distribution x by forming their own coalition which guarantees v S instead of x S . Let N, v , for any pair of players i, j N, i j the maximum surplus of player i over player j with respect to the pre-imputation x is given by the maximum excess at x over the set of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
The expression s i j x describes the maximal amount at the pre-imputation x that player i can gain without the cooperation of player j. The set of all pre-imputations x that balances the maximum surpluses for each distinct pair of player is called the pre-kernel of the game , and is defined by
The set of pre-kernel solutions consists of all pre-imputation x where each pair of players is symmetric with respect to the claims the players can assert against each other in a bargaining situation when each player uses "best arguments" over the set of all coalitions that support his claim. Therefore, the pre-kernel can be considered as a fair compromise by using "best arguments" against each other that balance the claims of each pair of players. This bargaining situation reflects a multi-bilateral bargaining equilibrium. Since player i cannot claim an additional amount from player j to reduce (increase) his loss (gain) . In case where s i j x > s ji x we say that player i outweighs player j. This can be interpreted that player i expresses his discontentment with the proposed pre-imputation x by claiming that player j should render him such an amount to balance their losses/gains. Player i can justify this claim by presenting "best arguments" that he can leave the coalition with player j and joins a coalition S i j where he can receive a smaller loss or a greater gain than player j can achieve by presenting his best arguments against player i. That means that the proposed pre-imputation x is contestable and therefore instable.
The main idea of the proposed algorithms to compute a pre-kernel solution is to use the geometry of the so-called strong Ε-core. By doing so, the algorithms specify these parts of the pre-kernel solution that intersects with the strong Ε-core. For any Ε IR, the strong Ε-core of the game , denoted by Ε , is the set of all pre-imputations x where the corresponding excesses over the set of proper coalitions is not greater than Ε, that is
To state it differently, the strong Ε-core consists of all pre-imputation that cannot be improved upon by any coalition, whenever the coalition formation process imposes costs of Ε IR or a bonus of Ε IR to every proper coalition in the game. In this sense, the strong Ε-core generalize the core concept. The core of the game , denoted by , consists of all pre-imputation that imposes no cost to the coalition formation process and give, therefore rise to non-positive excesses over the set of coalitions. It should be obvious by definition that 0 . For the geometrical characterization of the kernel and therefore for its calculation, we focus on the straight line segment that emanates from x Ε by decreasing x i and increasing x j by the same amount, for any pair of players i, j N, i j. We denote by ∆ Ε i j x the maximal amount at the pre-imputation x Ε that can be transferred from player i to player j while remaining in the strong Ε-core of the game . Thus, for any pre-imputation x Ε its associated critical bilateral transfer for a fixed pair of players i, j is defined as 6) where e k IR N represents the k-th unit vector. Note, that this critical bilateral transfer is for any pair of players i, j a well defined number, whenever x Ε , since the strong Ε-core is a convex polyhedron. For each x Ε the critical number ∆ Ε i j x specifies the maximum claim that can be asserted by player j in a bilateral bargain that cannot be opposed by player i by finding a coalition that support him in resisting the claim of j. Therefore, for any pre-imputation x Ε a certain bargaining range for each distinct pair of players can be specified. As it turns out below, depending on the real number Ε, parts or the complete pre-kernel can now be characterized for each distinct pair of players i, j as the midpoint of a bargaining range that is fully determined by the boundaries of any strong Ε-core. To obtain this relationship, observe that for any pre-imputation x 
for all i, j N, i j (Maschler et al. 1979, Lemma 3.4) . From the definition of the pre-kernel (2.4) and the result (2.7), it follows directly the bisection property of the pre-kernel as it has been worked out by Maschler et al. (1979) , and which is restated in the theorem below. Ε ji x is satisfied for all i, j N, i j. Thus, prekernel elements are those elements within the strong Ε-core that split the bargaining range in half for any pair of players. Furthermore, the theorem reveals that the strong Ε-cores can be considered as "windows" through which larger portions of the pre-kernel can be exposed by increasing the Ε-values.
The geometrical characterization of the pre-kernel as a solution that splits each line segment R Ε i j within the core in half is elucidated for a three person game by the next figure. Note that the pre-kernel of a game is a singleton that coincides with the nucleolus for three person and convex games. A game is called to be convex or supermodular if its characteristic function v satisfies Shapley (1971) ). Theorem 2.1 states that the bisection property for the various straight line segments induced by any strong Ε-core element is a necessary and sufficient condition for a (pre)-kernel element. But the above theorem is not constructive in telling us how we can specify the vector x that satisfies the bisection property. The next section propose now an algorithm that fills the gap by calculating a vector x, which satisfies the bisection property.
AN LP APPROACH TO COMPUTE THE (PRE)-KERNEL FOR ZERO-MONOTONIC GAMES
In this section we shall present an algorithm to compute the kernel for zero-monotonic TU-games. Note, that a game is called zero-monotonic, if v S v T i T S v i whenever S T is satisfied. The kernel of the game is defined by the set x s i j x s ji x or x j v j for all i, j N, i j , whereas x x i v i for all i N . Recall, that the kernel and pre-kernel of a game coincides for the class of zero-monotonic games, and therefore for all super-additive games, i.e.
v S v T v S T for all S, T N with S T
. Since both solution concepts coincides for the class of zero-monotinc games, and the pre-kernel is, unlike the kernel, formulated as a system of equalities and not of inequalities, we concentrate in our presentation of the LP algorithm on the pre-kernel solution.
For all i, j N, i j and every pre-imputation x we can construct a symmetrical line segment, denoted by i j x, ∆ , that emanates from x in the i-j and in its opposite j-i direction with equal length ∆. The symmetrical line segment i j x, ∆ with midpoint x and total length 2 ∆ has its associated endpoints at x ∆ e i ∆ e j and x ∆ e i ∆ e j . According to the fact that pre-kernel elements with y Ε are those elements in the strong Ε-core that are symmetrical with respect to each straight line segment R Ε i j y , we are interested in the maximum transfer for any pair of players for which the associated symmetrical line segment i j x, ∆ is still a subset of the strong Ε-core, that is 
For each distinct pair of players i, j , the maximal bi-symmetrical transfer can be considered as a maxmin expression given by ∆
Instead of specifying the maximal bi-symmetrical critical value ∆ Ε i j from a maximization over the strong Ε-core, it is of special interest to reveal the relationship of the bi-symmetrical critical transfer to a particular subset of the strong Ε-core which is related to those pre-imputations of the pre-kernel that satisfy the bisection property. This allows us to get a more simplified characterization of the maximal bi-symmetrical critical transfer ∆ (cf. Theorem 2.1). Therefore, the non-empty intersection of all bisecting hypersurfaces characterizes pre-kernel solutions.
In order to elucidate the geometrical characterization of the pre-kernel as a non-empty intersection of bisecting hypersurfaces, we depict by Figure 2 the bisecting surfaces for a three person game, where the pre-kernel solution is shown by its non-empty intersection. We denote by Ε i j the set of maximizers w.r.t. the maximization problem (3.5), which is given by 
Of course, this implies that it is in general not guaranteed that the pre-kernel is included in the set of pre-imputation with balanced maximal bisymmetrical critical transfers, that is, under certain circumstances it holds that
. In such a case, the intersection of all sets of maximizers Ε is an empty set with no relationship to the pre-kernel of the game . If, however, the intersection is non-empty, then we obtain Ε Ε . Hence every pre-imputation in the intersection set is also a pre-kernel element.
Let us now propose an algorithm to compute pre-kernel elements of a game by relying on a LP approach.
Algorithm for computing the (pre)-kernel.
In the foregoing discussion we saw that there is some relationship between the set of pre-imputation satisfying maximal balanced bi-symmetrical transfers and the intersection of bisecting hypersurfaces. In fact, we can expect to determine pre-kernel solutions by specifying the maximal bi-symmetrical transfer for all pairs of player i, j , if it holds that
Recall, that the maximal bi-symmetrical transfer ∆ Ε i j can be determined by the largest symmetrical line segment Ε x, ∆ that is still a subset of the strong Ε-core, that is
It turns out that the largest bi-symmetrical transfer for each distinct i-j direction can be determined by reformulating the characterization (3.1) as a linear programming problem. For any pair i, j and any fixed real number Ε, we denote by Ε i j a linear maximization problem that specifies the largest bi-symmetrical transfer and its associated midpoints in the i-j direction.
Step one: If the core is empty, then start with Ε IR , otherwise set Ε 0. In general, we formulate the linear maximization problem Note that an optimal solution x i j is a midpoint for the Ε i j which also satisfies the bisection property if x i j Ε . But due to the fact that we have specified the largest bi-symmetrical transfer ∆ Ε i j with its associated midpoints in the i-j direction, we cannot be sure that a solution vector x i j satisfies the bisection property, since we cannot guarantee that x i j Ε Ε is satisfied. If Ε is fulfilled, then we can simply take the intersection of all solutions sets Ε i j of type (3.7) to obtain the pre-kernel. But instead of taking the intersection of solution sets we can also use the results ∆ Ε i j, x i j obtained for each distinct i-j direction to construct a subset of the strong Ε-core that contains parts or the whole pre-kernel of the game . Observe, that we can expect to specify the complete pre-kernel, if it holds that Ε Ε . In case that Ε is satisfied, we cannot expect to construct a subset that does contain any pre-kernel element by relying on ∆ Ε i j, x i j , for all i, j N, i j. But nevertheless, we can perform a correction by an additional linear program, as it is discussed in turn by Step 2, to obtain pre-kernel solutions. By doing so, let us introduce the set i j x i j for every i, j N, i j such that the excesses for coalitions in i j with respect to the optimal pre-imputation x i j are equal to Ε ∆ Let us call by X the feasible set for a linear program that is constituted by all i j x i j sets and the efficiency property, hence we have X Ε . Our purpose is to reduce the set that contains pre-kernel solutions to a smaller set by considering the hyperplanes of only those coalitions that are relevant with respect to the selection procedure given by (3.9). But these coalitions need not to be relevant for determining pre-kernel solutions. These hyperplanes are only relevant in determining pre-kernel solutions, whenever for the intersection set of optimal solutions sets it is satisfied that Ε . To see this, observe that if Ε , it follows from (2.7), (3.6) and (3.9) that Ε X . Now let y Ε and suppose, in addition, that for at least one i-j direction it holds that ∆ Ε i j y < ∆ Ε i j, then the number Ε ∆ Ε i j is too small and the pre-kernel solution lies outside of the subset X , and we can conclude from (3.6) that must be satisfied. For such a situation we cannot guarantee that for a pre-imputation x X the bisection property is satisfied.
Note that the sets i j x i j given by Definition (3.9) are non-empty, this follows immediately from the result (2.7) derived by (Maschler et al. 1979, Lemma 3.4) . To see this, recall that the solution x i j is obtained by solving Problem (3.7) and it belongs to the strong Ε-core, hence x i j . Then all the sets of i j x i j determine all linear constraints for calculating pre-kernel candidates of a game . Therefore, we construct a subset of the strong Ε-core by considering the surplus s i j x i j for all i, j N, i j. But the feasible set X may be empty and an optimal solution fails to exist. In this case we have to perform a correction on the feasible set X to ensure non-emptiness. This will be done in Step two.
Step two: To make sure that the feasible set X constituted by all sets i j x i j is non-empty, we add for all i, j N N , i j an non-negative parameter Α i j to the right hand side of the constraints that have been constituted by the set i j x i j . To allow that a feasible solution exists for a linear problem, we have to minimize the sum of the parameters Α i j subject to the relaxed constraint set. Clearly, the feasible set is non-empty if and only if the minimum of the sum is zero, that is Α i j 0 for all pairs of players i, j N N , i j.
Let Α , x be an optimal solution of (3.10). The next result states that the solution of problem (3.10) performs an exact correction of an empty feasible set X to derive a pre-kernel solution. This result can also be considered as a stopping criterion of the LP algorithm. If, in contrast,
i j and therefore we have Β i j 0, which is the second part of (3.11).
Let us now suppose for the former case that x Ε i j X is given and that ∆ Ε i j x Β i j ∆ Ε i j with Β i j > 0 is fulfilled. Then we obtain from the constraint set of (3.10) that
For the feasibility of x X it is required that Α i j Β i j . Assume that Α i j < Β i j is given and recall from (2.3) that for at least one coalition S 0 i j we have e S 0 , x s i j x . This implies together with (2.7) that e S 0 , x > Ε ∆ Ε i j x Α i j Β i j is obtained, which violates the feasibility of x X from the constraint set (3.10). Hence, for the feasibility of a pre-imputation x it must satisfied that Α i j Β i j . Furthermore, note that Α i j is the decision variable of problem (3.10). Therefore, we get the minimum of the sum in (3.10), if Α i j Β i j .
To derive the first part of the characterization of Α given by (3.11), let us now presume that y Ε and suppose that y, x X is given. In addition, specify the largest bi-symmetrical transfer by
We have to consider two cases to obtain the first part of the characterization in (3.11). First, assume that
From the feasibility discussion, we know that the brackets in equation (3.12) could not be negative, hence Α i j min Α i j, Β i j and for a minimum it must hold that Α i j Α i j. We can conclude that all x Again from the minimum of Α i j, Β i j , it must hold for an optimal solution that Α i j Β i j . Otherwise, i.e., if Α i j < Α i j, but this implies together with the feasibility argument that y X , which contradicts our assumption of y X . Moreover, if Α i j Β i j , it must hold for the identity condition of (3.12) that Α i j Β i j and ∆ , then we get either X or X . For the latter case it turns out that our LP approach needs to perform a correction as described in Step 2 to compute pre-kernel elements. The more critical case is the former with X , since in this case it holds that ∆ Ε i j y < ∆ Ε i j whenever y . This implies that the number Ε ∆ Ε i j is too small, where we cannot perform any correction of Proposition 3.1, since for all pairs i, j it holds Α i j 0. Thus, for at least one i-j direction the largest bisymmetrical transfer ∆ Ε i j with a midpoint x Ε i j may of no relevance to compute a pre-kernel element. As a consequence the pre-kernel solution lies outside of the subset X . Due to the last example that will be discussed in next section, it seems to us that there exist two possibilities to overcome this problem. The first one deals with an adjustment of the Ε value in Step 1 to change the geometrical shape of the strong Ε-core to obtain Ε and therefore, the largest bi-symmetrical critical values are of importance to compute pre-kernel allocations. But instead of dealing with different Ε values, Proposition 3.1 suggests that it is enough to consider all extreme points of a solution set Ε i j to obtain pre-kernel solutions. In general, with each largest bi-symmetrical transfer multiple solutions are associated. According to Proposition 3.1 we have simply to choose that solution from . Then we are in the position to perform the exact correction mentioned in Proposition 3.1 to obtain pre-kernel elements.
Step three (final step): The optimal parameter vector Α relaxed the constraints to solve the following linear program
(3.13)
An optimal solution x of the problem (3.13) is a candidate of a pre-kernel solution, since the feasible set X needs not contain pre-kernel solutions, therefore, it must be checked whether x satisfies the properties of Definition (2.4). If the candidate x does not belong to the pre-kernel, then set Ε Ε 0 or increase the critical value Ε and return to Step one. The value Ε 0 specfies the smallest Ε number for which the strong Ε-core still exists, this critical number is given by Ε 0 min x max S ,N e x, S which could, of course, be negative. By setting the Ε-value to its least core value Ε 0 we can ensure that the algorithm will stop. Evidently, in the case that x we can easily check from the final tableau whether further extreme points exist which belong to the kernel or pre-kernel. But note that we cannot determine with this approach pre-kernel elements that belong to set Ε Ε .
REMARK 3.2. Recall that due to Theorem 2.1 we can expose larger parts of the pre-kernel by increasing the number Ε. We expect that there exist a threshold level of Ε that ensure that the complete pre-kernel is included in the strong Ε -core. Therefore, it is of particular importance to specify conditions on Ε that the strong Ε-core is large enough to include the whole pre-kernel instead of using arbitrary numbers of Ε that probably determine only a small portion of the pre-kernel solution. And indeed, besides other critical numbers Maschler et al. (1979) could derive the following condition on Ε that guarantees that the entire pre-kernel is a subset of for all strong Ε-cores with real number Ε is greater than the threshold value Ε , that is Ε max v S r N S v N . (3.14) For all Ε Ε it is assured that the entire kernel of the game is included in the strong epsilon core, that is, Ε (cf. Maschler et al. (1979, Theorem 3.15 and Corollary 3.16 for the pre-kernel)).
3 REMARK 3.3. Observe that the approach performed in Step 2 can be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game through the parameters Α, ∆ and Ε, for which an non-empty feasible set X can be now considered as the core of this new game. To see this, note that from (3.10) we can adjust the value of a coalition S which belongs to one of sets i j x i j by subtracting the smallest number of Ε ∆ Ε i j Α i j from v S , while coalitions which does not belong to any set of i j x i j get a value of zero. The purpose is to disturb the original game by the mentioned parameters without changing the pre-kernel solution of the game, that is, the perturbed and original game have the same pre-kernel solution. If, however, the prekernel candidate is not a pre-kernel solution, then the perturbed game and the original game have different pre-kernel solutions, i.e., the performed correction was not appropriate. 3 REMARK 3.4. It should be obvious that an optimal solution x of Problem (3.10) solves also the Problem (3.13). To see that, suppose that there exists an non efficient payoff vector x that solves Problem (3.10) where some of the Α i j 's are supposed to be strictly positive. In this case we can redistribute the amount v N x N > 0 equally between the players. This implies that the excesses for all coalitions will decrease and we can lower the values of the strictly positive Α i j 's in the constraint set. Since the sum can be reduced the chosen payoff vector cannot be optimal. Due to this argument a payoff vector that solve the Problem (3.10) must also be efficient. But this is exactly the maximal sum that can be achieved in Problem (3.13), hence such a vector solves also Problem (3.13). But that means that step three is superfluous, if one is just interested in one kernel point and not in the structure of the kernel.
Step three is useful to look on further solution points to investigate the structure of the kernel solution by studying whether the solution found in Step 2 is degenerate or not. 3
TWO NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we want to illustrate by two numerical examples our new approach to compute elements of the pre-kernel by focusing on the largest bi-symmetrical transfer. The first example falls in the category for which we can characterize pre-kernel elements by this new approach. The second example, however, belongs to the category for which we need to perturb the original game as described by
Step 2 to compute pre-kernel allocations. Since, the game is a three person game and zero-monotonic, the kernel is singleton that coincides with the pre-kernel of the game. The kernel is given by x 1 , x 2 , x 3 35, 40, 45 .
Step one: The core of the game is non-empty, we will set Ε to zero, thus we get for any i, j N, i j the linear program given by problem (4.2). We have then to solve the system of linear programs of type (4.2): max ∆ subject to 35 the set 32 x 23 generates the constraint for the set 1, 3 .
We visualize the selection procedure of the constraint set by the excess matrix given by Although, we have just calculated one solution for the corresponding linear problems, we are nevertheless able to find the whole solution sets by geometrical arguments by depicting the core of the 3-person game. Introducing the distinct solution sets in the core of Figure 3 reveals that the intersection of the solution set is an non-empty set, and therefore the kernel point of the game can be geometrical determined by its point of intersection. Notice that the solution set of problem 1-2 is included in the solution set of 1-3, that is, Step two: Solve now the following linear program to assure that the feasible set is non-empty Step one: We set Ε to zero, thus we get for all i, j N, i j the linear program given by problem (4.7).
We have then to solve the system of linear programs given by (4.7)
max ∆ subject to
with k N i, j . By solving the above system of linear programs for all i, j N, i j, we obtain the following solutions: ∆ performing a correction of Step 2 to compute pre-kernel elements by taking those extreme points from the solution sets which yields to X , otherwise we have to adjust the geometrical structure of the strong Ε-core by changing the Ε value. See also the discussion at the end of this example Step two: Solve now the following linear program to assure that the feasible set is non-empty min Α 12 Α 13 subject to
Solution of the problem (4.8) gives us Α 12 , Α 13 x 1 , x 2 , x 3 5, 0 20, 20, 20 , hence the constructed feasible set in Step 1 was empty and we turned the empty set into an non-empty by performing the above correction. Further, we conclude that the bi-symmetrical transfer must be 20 in the 1-2 direction at the pre-kernel solution y, since ∆ The solution of the final linear program gives us x 1 , x 2 , x 3 20, 20, 20 , which is, the pre-kernel solution of the game as defined in (4.6). Furthermore, the feasible set of the problem (4.9) specifies exactly the least Ε-core with its unique imputation 20, 20, 20 as the reader may check, where Ε 0 20. Let us now return to the discussion of Remark 3.1 to observe that it is of particular importance which extreme point from a solution set is chosen to contruct the feasible set X . Consider that a second extreme point for the 1-2 direction besides 25, 25, 10 is the vector 35, 25, 0 . Together with its associated largest bi-symmetrical transfer of ∆ 25 applied to the pre-kernel solution x yields an endpoint of 5, 45, 20 in contrast to the endpoint 0, 40, 20 related to the kernel, whenever ∆ 0 12 x 20 is applied. Thus, the largest bi-symmetrical transfer in the 1-2 direction is too great whenever it is applied to the kernel solution. That means that the geometrical structure of the core of the game is inappropriate to compute the pre-kernel. To find now a pre-kernel solution of the game 4.6 the shape of the Ε-core must be adjusted to ensure that Ε is satisfied or that the excat correction of Proposition 3.1 can be applied.
A KERNEL ELEMENT AS A SOLUTION OF A MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
In this section we illustrate that a pre-kernel element can be computed as a solution of just one LP. This result is similar to the result derived for the nucleolus by Kohlberg (1972) . For convex games the linear maximization problem determines the pre-kernel and the nucleolus of the game since for these game types both solution concepts coalesce. That is, an alternative linear programming approach to compute the pre-kernel and nucleolus of a convex game is presented.
Instead of solving a system of n 2 1 LPs to calculate pre-kernel elements it is also possible to calculate pre-kernel elements by just one LP. Recall, that in the previous algorithm we compute these parts of the pre-kernel which falls within the strong Ε-core. In the first step of our algorithm we find for each each i-j direction a payoff vector x i j that solves the associated linear maximization problem i j of type (3.7). The solution found is a midpoint of the symmetrical line segment Ε i j x i j , ∆ Ε i j such that the endpoints remain in the strong Ε-core. In the discussion of the algorithm, however, we have seen that in cases where not the exact correction of Proposition 3.1 was applied for the geometrical shape of the strong Ε-core is not appropriate and some largest bi-symmetrical transfers ∆ Ε i j are of no importance to calculate a pre-kernel element. We cannot find the constraints to determine our final linear program correctly and the pre-kernel is not included in the feasible set X . In this case at least one largest amount ∆ Ε i j evaluated at a pre-kernel imputation y is too large to assure that the endpoints of the pre-kernel in the corresponding i-j direction belong to the Ε-core, and that this case happens when the intersection set of solution sets is empty, that is Ε together with X . Thus, the feasible set X in problem (3.13) is too tight to compute a prekernel element and this requires a further call of the program. Now, recall from the discussion of Section 2 that an imputation x belongs to the pre-kernel if and only if ∆ 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented an LP approach to compute parts or the whole pre-kernel for zero-monotonic cooperative games. The merits as well as the demerits have been discussed in the paper. In our opinion one of its main merits is that we get very quickly an insight into the structure of the pre-kernel. In contrast to a convergence algorithm where we get no knowledge about the location of an element, and therefore we need more additional runs to get more informations. This clearly offsets the efficiency advantage of a convergence algorithm. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned again that we are not able to find the whole pre-kernel of the game, whenever the non-empty intersection of all solution sets is an inclusion set of the intersection of all bisecting hypersurfaces, that is Ε $ Ε . But due to the derived structure the task should not be too difficult to deduce on the whole pre-kernel.
